{ "schemaVersion": "opennash.scenario.v1", "scenarioVersion": "1.1", "solverVersion": "2.5.0", "id": "ai-pact", "number": "01", "title": "OpenNash Policy Model", "shortTitle": "OpenNash Policy Model", "sourcePath": "/opennash/scenarios/ai-pact-v1.1.json", "publishedAt": "2026-07-26", "modelClass": "two-player-two-strategy-simultaneous-one-shot", "status": "illustrative", "payoffUnits": "Illustrative utility units. Values are authorial and have no empirical scale.", "aggregationRule": "The equilibrium solver compares each actor only with that actor’s own unilateral-deviation payoff. Any sum across actors uses equal weights as a separate, contestable analytic assumption.", "brief": "Stress-test a US policy package against China’s response across energy access, proprietary data and intellectual property, and each country’s concentrated economic assets.", "stakes": "US knowledge assets lose value when intelligence becomes cheap. China’s manufacturing assets lose value when markets, inputs, or energy access are constrained. Escalation can depreciate both asset bases.", "interventionEnvelope": { "budget": 8, "step": 0.5, "instruments": { "capacityInvestment": { "maximum": 4, "description": "Add a capacity-investment reward to the selected actor when that actor chooses its cooperative strategy." }, "marketAccessCondition": { "maximum": 4, "description": "Subtract a direct market-access condition from the selected actor when that actor chooses its adversarial strategy." }, "transitionTransfer": { "maximum": 4, "description": "Transfer payoff to the selected recipient only in the mutual-cooperation cell. The other actor pays the same amount." } }, "costDefinition": "Intervention cost is capacityInvestment + marketAccessCondition + transitionTransfer. A package is valid when the sum is at most 8." }, "strategicVectors": [ { "id": "energy", "label": "Energy access", "us": "The United States needs more reliable power for compute, industrial automation, and reindustrialization.", "china": "China’s larger manufacturing base turns energy availability into physical production capacity.", "contest": "Grid investment increases domestic resilience. Restrictions on energy technology, fuels, and industrial inputs can reduce the other side’s capacity." }, { "id": "data-ip", "label": "Proprietary data + IP", "us": "Frontier models, software, proprietary datasets, and research methods are a concentrated source of value.", "china": "Open-weight distribution and distillation can lower the scarcity value of closed intelligence while training inputs remain opaque.", "contest": "Access rules, provenance standards, application programming interface controls, and verified disclosure change who captures the value of intelligence." }, { "id": "gdp-concentration", "label": "GDP concentration", "us": "A knowledge- and services-heavy economy is exposed when software and intelligence rents are commoditized.", "china": "A manufacturing-heavy economy is exposed when export markets, components, or energy-intensive production are constrained.", "contest": "Each side has an incentive to depreciate the asset class where the other side concentrates more economic value." } ], "actors": [ { "id": "us", "label": "United States", "role": "Knowledge-heavy economy", "strategies": [ { "id": "rebalance", "label": "Build energy + diffuse intelligence", "incentive": "Expand power and industrial capacity while using lower-cost, verifiable AI to reduce dependence on a small set of knowledge rents." }, { "id": "contain", "label": "Protect IP + constrain industry", "incentive": "Defend proprietary data and closed-model value while restricting the inputs, markets, and technology that support China’s manufacturing base." } ] }, { "id": "china", "label": "China", "role": "Manufacturing-heavy economy", "strategies": [ { "id": "reciprocal", "label": "Trade industrial access for verification", "incentive": "Keep industrial supply dependable and expose enough model provenance to earn trusted access to knowledge-intensive markets." }, { "id": "depreciate", "label": "Commoditize intelligence + use chokepoints", "incentive": "Distribute low-cost weights that compress US software rents while retaining leverage in manufacturing, components, and physical supply chains." } ] } ], "cooperativeStrategies": { "us": "rebalance", "china": "reciprocal" }, "statusQuoProfile": "contain|depreciate", "concept": "Illustrative one-shot asset-depreciation game", "lesson": "The matrix is an authorial hypothesis, not a calibrated forecast. Compare the published worldview panels and robustness results before you interpret a policy result.", "narratives": { "rebalance|reciprocal": { "title": "Mutual depreciation slows.", "copy": "Energy investment, verifiable intelligence, and dependable industrial access make growth more valuable than attacking the other side’s concentrated assets." }, "rebalance|depreciate": { "title": "China captures the diffusion gain.", "copy": "The United States expands capacity, but cheap opaque intelligence and industrial leverage depreciate US knowledge assets before the physical investment pays back." }, "contain|reciprocal": { "title": "Reciprocity meets containment.", "copy": "China offers verification and industrial access, but US restrictions keep the trust benefit from becoming full market access." }, "contain|depreciate": { "title": "Both sides attack the other’s balance sheet.", "copy": "US controls target manufacturing capacity. Chinese proliferation targets knowledge rents. Under this matrix, neither actor gains from a unilateral move away from the adversarial profile." } }, "sources": [ { "id": "authorial-growth-interdependence-v1.1", "type": "authorial", "title": "OpenNash growth-and-interdependence worldview", "citation": "OpenNash editorial modeling judgment, scenario version 1.1.", "url": null, "note": "These illustrative values are not calibrated to observed data or elicited from external experts." }, { "id": "authorial-security-first-v1.1", "type": "authorial", "title": "OpenNash security-first worldview", "citation": "OpenNash editorial modeling judgment, scenario version 1.1.", "url": null, "note": "These illustrative values are not calibrated to observed data or elicited from external experts." } ], "defaultPanelId": "growth-interdependence", "worldviewPanels": [ { "id": "growth-interdependence", "label": "Growth and interdependence", "summary": "This authorial panel gives substantial value to mutual capacity growth and verified exchange while retaining a short-run temptation to exploit diffusion.", "authorial": true, "grade": "C", "sourceIds": ["authorial-growth-interdependence-v1.1"], "payoffs": { "rebalance|reciprocal": { "rationale": "The United States expands energy-backed adoption and reduces its reliance on closed-model rents. China keeps industrial access credible and accepts verification costs. Both asset bases grow through complementarity instead of mutual depreciation.", "values": [ { "point": 8, "low": 6.5, "high": 9.5, "grade": "C", "basis": "Authorial estimate of US gains from capacity growth and verified exchange.", "sourceIds": ["authorial-growth-interdependence-v1.1"] }, { "point": 8, "low": 6.5, "high": 9.5, "grade": "C", "basis": "Authorial estimate of Chinese gains from dependable industrial access and verified exchange.", "sourceIds": ["authorial-growth-interdependence-v1.1"] } ] }, "rebalance|depreciate": { "rationale": "The United States pays to expand energy and diffuse intelligence. China captures more of the adoption gain through cheap weights and industrial leverage while US knowledge rents fall faster than physical capacity adjusts.", "values": [ { "point": 3, "low": 1.5, "high": 4.5, "grade": "C", "basis": "Authorial estimate of US transition losses when diffusion outpaces physical adjustment.", "sourceIds": ["authorial-growth-interdependence-v1.1"] }, { "point": 9, "low": 7.5, "high": 10.5, "grade": "C", "basis": "Authorial estimate of Chinese gains from combining low-cost intelligence with industrial leverage.", "sourceIds": ["authorial-growth-interdependence-v1.1"] } ] }, "contain|reciprocal": { "rationale": "China offers industrial access and greater verification, but US containment preserves knowledge rents and limits the market benefit China expected from reciprocity.", "values": [ { "point": 7, "low": 5.5, "high": 8.5, "grade": "C", "basis": "Authorial estimate of US gains from protected knowledge rents under partial reciprocity.", "sourceIds": ["authorial-growth-interdependence-v1.1"] }, { "point": 3, "low": 1.5, "high": 4.5, "grade": "C", "basis": "Authorial estimate of Chinese losses when verification does not produce expected market access.", "sourceIds": ["authorial-growth-interdependence-v1.1"] } ] }, "contain|depreciate": { "rationale": "The United States protects proprietary intelligence and constrains industrial inputs. China commoditizes software value and uses manufacturing chokepoints. Each side damages the asset base where the other is more concentrated, and both lose wider adoption and investment.", "values": [ { "point": 4, "low": 2.5, "high": 5.5, "grade": "C", "basis": "Authorial estimate of US security gains net of lost adoption and retaliation costs.", "sourceIds": ["authorial-growth-interdependence-v1.1"] }, { "point": 6, "low": 4.5, "high": 7.5, "grade": "C", "basis": "Authorial estimate of Chinese leverage gains net of constrained inputs and markets.", "sourceIds": ["authorial-growth-interdependence-v1.1"] } ] } } }, { "id": "security-first", "label": "Security first", "summary": "This authorial panel assigns more value to relative advantage and strategic autonomy and less value to joint surplus.", "authorial": true, "grade": "C", "sourceIds": ["authorial-security-first-v1.1"], "payoffs": { "rebalance|reciprocal": { "rationale": "Verified exchange produces joint gains, but each government discounts those gains because dependence on the other side remains a security exposure.", "values": [ { "point": 6, "low": 4, "high": 7.5, "grade": "C", "basis": "Authorial estimate that US security concerns discount the value of mutual exchange.", "sourceIds": ["authorial-security-first-v1.1"] }, { "point": 6, "low": 4, "high": 7.5, "grade": "C", "basis": "Authorial estimate that Chinese security concerns discount the value of mutual exchange.", "sourceIds": ["authorial-security-first-v1.1"] } ] }, "rebalance|depreciate": { "rationale": "The United States absorbs transition costs while China values relative advantage from intelligence diffusion and industrial leverage.", "values": [ { "point": 2, "low": 0.5, "high": 3.5, "grade": "C", "basis": "Authorial estimate of US losses when unilateral openness increases strategic exposure.", "sourceIds": ["authorial-security-first-v1.1"] }, { "point": 9, "low": 7, "high": 10.5, "grade": "C", "basis": "Authorial estimate of Chinese relative-position gains from unilateral US rebalancing.", "sourceIds": ["authorial-security-first-v1.1"] } ] }, "contain|reciprocal": { "rationale": "US containment preserves relative advantage while China bears verification costs without receiving dependable access.", "values": [ { "point": 8, "low": 6, "high": 9.5, "grade": "C", "basis": "Authorial estimate of US relative-position gains under asymmetric restraint.", "sourceIds": ["authorial-security-first-v1.1"] }, { "point": 2.5, "low": 1, "high": 4, "grade": "C", "basis": "Authorial estimate of Chinese losses under asymmetric restraint.", "sourceIds": ["authorial-security-first-v1.1"] } ] }, "contain|depreciate": { "rationale": "Both sides preserve some strategic autonomy and relative leverage, but reciprocal restrictions reduce joint growth and increase adjustment costs.", "values": [ { "point": 5.5, "low": 3.5, "high": 7, "grade": "C", "basis": "Authorial estimate of US security value net of escalation and forgone growth.", "sourceIds": ["authorial-security-first-v1.1"] }, { "point": 6, "low": 4, "high": 7.5, "grade": "C", "basis": "Authorial estimate of Chinese security value net of restrictions and forgone growth.", "sourceIds": ["authorial-security-first-v1.1"] } ] } } } ] }